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Abstract
We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that
the grand coalition is necessarily the final state of cooperation. Partitions of the
grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing weights
interpreted as a time allocation vector are considered as possible states of cooper-
ation. The former case corresponds to the c-core, while the latter corresponds to
the aspiration core or d-core, where in both case, the best configuration (called a
maximising collection) is sought. We study maximising collections and characterize
them with autonomous coalitions, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the
d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worth. In particular we show
that the collection of autonomous coalitions is balanced, and that one cannot have
at the same time a single possible payment (core element) and a single possible
configuration. We also introduce the notion of inescapable coalitions, that is, those
present in every maximising collection. We characterize the class of games for which
the sets of autonomous coalitions, vital coalitions (in the sense of Shellshear and
Sudho¨lter), and inescapable coalitions coincide, and prove that the set of games
having a unique maximising coalition is dense in the set of games.
Keywords: cooperative game, core, balancedness, c-core, aspiration core, coalition
formation, autonomous coalitions
JEL Classification: C71
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1 Introduction
The main concern of cooperative game theory is to find a rational way to reward players
for their cooperation. The traditional view assumes that eventually the grand coalition
will form, so that the problem reduces to a sharing of the worth (benefit) created by the
grand coalition among all players. Along this view, one of the most popular solutions
of this problem is the core (Gillies, 1953, 1959): it is the set of allocations (payoff vec-
tors) such that no coalition receives an amount lower than its own worth (this is called
coalitional rationality).
It is well known that the main drawback of the core is that it is empty for a large class
of games, namely the nonbalanced games. One way to escape this situation, among the
many others which have been studied in the literature, is that we allow for a more general
situation of cooperation (the grand coalition may be not the only state of cooperation), or
a more general notion of allocation. In the latter case, Grabisch and Miranda (2008) have
proposed to share the worth of the grand coalition not only among individual players, but
also among all coalitions, up to a certain size k. This is called the k-additive core, and
this notion has been further refined in (Gonzalez and Grabisch, forthcoming), leading to
the negotiation set. In the former case, there exists natural generalizations of the core,
once it is admitted that players may eventually form either disjoint coalitions, i.e., a
partition of the grand coalition, or a collection of coalitions which has the property to be
balanced: interpreting the balancing weights as amounts of time and assuming that each
player has one unit of time to spend (see for example Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003)), this
unit can be split among different coalitions of this collection. The c-core (Guesnerie and
Oddou, 1979; Sun et al., 2008) corresponds to the case where players form a partition
of the grand coalition, while the d-core (a.k.a. aspiration core) (Bennett, 1983; Cross,
1967; Albers, 1979), which is never empty, corresponds to the more general case where
players share their unit of time into different coalitions. It is important to note that the
partition, or the balanced collection, which represents the final state of cooperation, is
chosen so as to maximise the total worth obtained by cooperation, and for this reason,
we call them maximising collections. In the case of a partition, the total worth is simply
the sum of the worth of the coalitions in the partition, while for a balanced collection,
one need to take into account the time allocated to each coalition: considering a utility
linear in time, one simply compute the weighted sum of the worths, where the weights
corresponds to the allotted times: see Cesco (2012) for an axiomatization of such kind
of solution, and Bejan and Go´mez (2012a), who implements the d-core in strong Nash
equilibria.
In a sense, the coalitions which are present in the maximising collection representing
the final state of cooperation, have a strong power compared to the other ones. Then the
following questions arise: can these coalitions be characterized by some property? Is there
some relation with other special families of coalitions, like the vital coalitions introduced
by Shellshear and Sudho¨lter (2009)? The aim of this paper is to study this question
in depth. One of the main contribution of this paper is that the ”strong” coalitions
are the autonomous coalitions, introduced in (Gonzalez and Grabisch, forthcoming). An
autonomous coalition of a game is defined as a coalition such that any d-core element
yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worth. For a balanced game, the grand
coalition is always autonomous, but it is not the only one in general (see, e.g., the
2
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.44
glove game). We prove that the existence of a nontrivial autonomous coalition implies
the existence of a covering of autonomous coalitions, and that any balanced covering
of autonomous coalitions is a maximising collection, and vice versa: this completely
characterizes the strong coalitions of the final cooperation state. Moreover, the set of all
autonomous coalitions is balanced. A noticeable consequence of our results is that for
balanced games, it is not possible to have at the same time a unique possible payment and
a unique (or even a finite number of) configuration of coalitions achieving this payment:
if the core is reduced to a singleton, then the set of possible configurations (balanced
collections with time allocation) is a polyhedron, not reduced to a singleton.
A second natural question arises: suppose that there exists more than one maximising
collection (this is the case of the glove game). Then it is not possible to know what will be
the final state of cooperation. However, in this case, there exist coalitions with a special
property: every maximising collection contains them, and for this reason we call them
inescapable. We show that inescapable coalitions are vital, in the sense of Shellshear
and Sudho¨lter (2009). Games having a unique maximising collection are of particular
interest since one can know without ambiguity the final state of cooperation, and for this
reason, we call them games with a single state of cooperation (SSC games). We prove
that the set of SSC games is dense in the set of games on a given set of players. As a
last important result, we give a sufficient and necessary condition for which the sets of
autonomous coalitions, vital coalitions, and inescapable coalitions, are all equal.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the necessary background on
the c-core, d-core and maximising collections. Section 3 introduces autonomous coalitions
and characterizes maximising collections in terms of autonomous coalitions. Section 4
deals with inescapable coalitions and SSC games, and establishes the links between the
various types of coalitions introduced (vital, autonomous, inescapable). Section 5 con-
cludes the paper by giving some final remarks, in particular related to the k-additive
core.
2 Maximising systems
We start by fixing the notation and introducing basic definitions. For any nonempty
finite set A, we denote by Π(A) the set of partitions over A and |A| the cardinal of A.
Let N denote a fixed finite nonempty set with n members, who will be called agents or
players. Coalitions of players are nonempty subsets of N , denoted by capital letters S,
T , and so on. Whenever possible, we will omit braces for singletons and pairs, denoting
{i}, {i, j} by i, ij respectively, in order to avoid a heavy notation
A transferable utility (TU) game onN is a pair (N, v) where v is a mapping v : 2N → R
satisfying v(∅) = 0. We denote by G(N) the set of all games over N . For any coalition
S, v(S) represents the worth of S, i.e., what coalition S could earn regardless of other
players.
A payoff vector is a vector x ∈ Rn that assigns to agent i the payoff xi. For any
coalition T ⊂ N , we denote by vT the restriction of v to 2
T . Given x ∈ Rn, and S ⊆ N ,
denote by x(S) the sum
∑
i∈S
xi with the convention that x(∅) = 0.
A general payoff vector Gonzalez and Grabisch (forthcoming) is a vector x ∈ R2
N\∅
that assigns to coalition S ⊆ N the payoff xS.
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A balanced system of N is a vector λ = (λS)S⊆N ∈ [0, 1]
2N such that∑
S⊆N
λSχ
S = χN ,
where χS is the characteristic vector of S given by χSi = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. We
denote by B(N) the set of balanced systems over N . For λ ∈ B(N), we denote by B(λ)
the set defined by:
B(λ) = {S ⊆ N, λS > 0}.
A collection B ⊆ 2N , is called balanced (over N) if there exits a balanced system
λ ∈ B(N) such that B = B(λ). A balanced collection is minimal if no subcollection of it
is balanced. It is well-known that a balanced collection B is minimal if and only if there
is a unique balanced system λ ∈ B(N) such that B = B(λ).
Definition 1. For a game v ∈ G(N) we define
(i) The set of preimputations of v as:
PI(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N)}.
(ii) The set of c-preimputations of v as:
c-PI(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = max
π∈Π(N)
∑
S∈π
v(S)}.
(iii) The set of d-preimputations of v as:
d-PI(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = max
λ∈B(N)
∑
S∈B
λSv(S)}.
(iv) The set of k-preimputation of v, with k ∈ N as:
k-PI(v) := {(xS)S⊆N ∈ R
2n , xS = 0 if |S| > k and
∑
S⊆N
xS = v(N)}
We remark that in the definition of d-preimputations, we need not write sup instead of
max, since the maximum is attained for some balanced system. Indeed, it is well known
that the set B(N) is a closed convex polytope in R(2
N ), hence compact, and since the
function
∑
λ∈B(N) λSv(S) is a continuous function on this domain, it reaches its maximum
at some point (even more, this point will be an extreme point since the function is linear).
In the classical view of preimputations, it is supposed that the grand coalition will
form, and its worth is shared among the players. With a c-preimputation, the best parti-
tion of the players is sought, in order to maximise the total worth. Now, d-preimputations
generalize c-preimputations since partitions are particular balanced collections. More
importantly, d-preimputations have an interesting interpretation if one considers λS for
S ⊆ N as an amount of time1 allocated to S. Assuming that v(S) represents the worth
or the production per unit of time, λSv(S) is the total worth/production achieved by
S. Under this viewpoint, a d-preimputation is a sharing among the players of the total
worth which can be achieved by the best arrangement of the players in time.
1Although usually it is interpreted as an amount of resources (Kannai, 1992).
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Definition 2. For any game v ∈ G(N) we define
(i) The core (Gillies, 1953) of v as:
C(v) := {x ∈ PI(v) | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N}.
(ii) The c-core (Guesnerie and Oddou, 1979) of v as:
c-C(v) := {x ∈ c-PI(v) | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N}.
(iii) The d-core2 (Albers, 1979) of v or aspiration core (Bennett, 1983) of v as:
d-C(v) := {x ∈ d-PI(v) | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N}.
A game v is totally balanced if, for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , vS is balanced. The totally
balanced cover of v denoted by vtb is given by:
vtb(S) = max{
∑
T⊆S
λTv(T ) | λ ∈ B(S)}
It is well known and easy to prove that d-C(v) = C(vtb).
We say that a game v is balanced if C(v) is nonempty, and c-balanced if c-C(v) is
nonempty. The following results, proved independently by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley
(1967), are well known.
Theorem 1 (The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, weak form). A necessary and sufficient
condition that the core of a game (N, v) is not empty is that for each balanced system
λ ∈ B(N),
v(N) ≥
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S).
Theorem 2 (The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, sharp form). A necessary and sufficient
condition that the core of a game (N, v) is not empty is that for each minimal balanced
collection B:
v(N) ≥
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S)
where λ ∈ B(N) is the unique balanced system such that B(λ) = B.
Observe that the statement is still true if the minimal balanced collection {N} is
discarded.
Given a game (N, v) and t ≥ 0, define its t-expansion vt by vt(S) = v(S) for all S ⊂ N ,
and vt(N) = v(N)+ t. Now, to any game (N, v) we assign t¯(v) := min{t ≥ 0 | C(v) 6= ∅},
(Bejan and Go´mez, 2012b) the minimum amount to be given to the grand coalition in
order to ensure balancedness.
The following lemma is central in our analysis.
2See also Albers (1974) and Turbay (1977).
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Lemma 1. For any game (N, v), any balanced system λ ∈ B(N), it holds
v(N) + t¯(v) ≥
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S)
and there exists at least one minimal balanced system for which equality holds.
Any balanced system for which equality holds is called a maximising system.
Proof. Since v t¯(v) is balanced and t¯(v) ≥ 0, it follows by Theorem 1 that for every balanced
system λ
v(N) + t¯(v) ≥
∑
S∈B
λSv
t¯(v)(S) ≥
∑
S∈B
λSv(S).
Now, if v is balanced, then t¯(v) = 0, and equality holds taking B = {N}. Otherwise,
suppose that
∑
S⊆N λSv(S) < v(N) + t¯(v) for every balanced system, and define
0 < t′ = max
λ∈B(N)
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S)− v(N) < t¯(v). (1)
(first inequality comes from the fact that v is not balanced and Theorem 1) Then for ev-
ery balanced system λ,
∑
S⊆N λSv(S) ≤ v(N)+ t
′ holds. We claim that
∑
S⊆N λSv
t′(S) ≤
v(N) + t′ holds for every minimal balanced collection, which by the sharp form of
Bondareva-Shapley theorem, implies that vt
′
is balanced, a contradiction with the defi-
nition of t¯(v).
Proof of the claim: for the minimal balanced collection {N}, the inequality trivially
holds. Now, any other minimal balanced collection cannot contain N . Therefore∑
S⊆N
λSv
t′(S) =
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S),
which proves the claim by (1).
Finally, consider the following linear program in variables λS, S ∈ 2
N ,
maximize
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S)
subject to
∑
S∋i
λS = 1, i ∈ N
λS ≥ 0, S ∈ 2
N
(note that the feasible domain is the set of balancing weights for all balanced collections)
The above reasoning has proved that this linear program has an optimal solution, and
the value of the objective function is v(N)+ t¯(v). Since there is an optimal solution which
is a vertex of the feasible domain, and since it is well known that vertices correspond to
minimal balanced collections, the proof is complete.
The following proposition clarifies the position of the different notions introduced so
far.
Proposition 1. For any game v in G(N), we have:
C(v) ⊆ c-C(v) ⊆ d-C(v) = C(v t¯(v)),
and equality holds everywhere if and only if v is balanced.
6
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We provide a simple proof of this result. The inclusions where shown by, e.g., Bejan
and Go´mez (2012b), and the last equality by Cross (1967) and Bennett (1983).
Proof. By Lemma 1, maxλ∈B(N)
∑
S⊆N λSv(S) = v(N) + t¯(v), which proves that any
element of the d-core is also an element of C(v t¯(v)) and vice versa. The last equality is
therefore established.
To see the second inclusion, suppose that c-C(v) 6= ∅, otherwise the result trivially
holds. By definition of t¯(v), any x ∈ Rn satisfying x(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ 2N must
satisfy x(N) ≥ v(N)+ t¯(v). If in addition x ∈ c-C(v) and since a partition is a particular
balanced collection, it follows by Lemma 1 that x(N) = v(N)+ t¯(v), hence x is an element
of the d-core.
Finally, if the core is empty, the first inclusion trivially holds. Otherwise, t¯(v) = 0, so
that C(v) = C(v t¯(v)) and equality holds throughout.
From the last equality, it is clear that the d-core is never empty. We see immediatly
that if the core of v is nonempty then t¯(v) = 0 and λ ∈ B(N) defined by λN = 1 and
λS = 0 is a maximising system. If the c-core of v is nonempty, then there exists a
partition π ∈ Π(N) and a maximising system λ ∈ B(N) such that λS > 0 ⇔ S ∈ π,
and t¯(v) =
∑
S∈π λSv(S)− v(N). Otherwise, there exists a maximising system λ ∈ B(N)
such that t¯(v) =
∑
S⊆N λSv(S) − v(N). In his article about the d-core, Cross (1967)
described his solution as a set of stable coalitions with their associated payoffs. Literature
focuses essentially on the set of payoffs without considering the properties of the set of
corresponding coalitions. Cesco (2012) gives and axiomatizes a new kind of solution which
associates to each game not only an amount of the d-core but also the coalitions which
permit to reach this amount, that is, the coalitions S such that there exists a maximising
system λ∗ ∈ B(N) which satisfies λ(S) > 0. Bejan and Go´mez (2012a) implements the
d-core in strong Nash equilibria, corresponding strategies consist of giving an amount of
the d-core and an arrangement of the players in time given by a maximising system which
permits to reach this amount.
As we have seen, a maximising system can be interpreted as the best arrangement of
the players in time. For balanced games, players can stay in the grand coalition, in the
case of c-balanced games, each player can stay in the coalition given by the best partition
while other games require that some players change coalitions over time. The quantity
t¯(v) indicates the deviation from balancedness of a game. It may be interesting to study
the behavior of v 7→ t¯(v) and how the configuration of players over time changes when
the game slightly changes.
Denote by B∗N the mapping which associates to each game v ∈ G(N) the set of
maximising systems for v. We can interpret B∗N as a correspondence, giving for each game
all the possible best configurations of players over time. We will show and characterise
in Section 4.3 the games which possess a unique best configuration for players, that is,
games such that B∗N gives a singleton.
Example 1. Let v ∈ G(12) defined by v(1) = v(2) = v(12) = 0. In this case, B∗12(v) =
B(12), that is, all the arrangements of the players in time are equivalent, their final
production will be always equal to zero. Let us propose two perturbations of the game
v. For ǫ > 0, we define v+ and v− by:
(i) v+(1) = v+(2) = 0 and v+(12) = ǫ > 0
7
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(ii) v−(1) = v−(2) = 0 and v−(12) = −ǫ < 0
For those two games, as closed as we want to the original game, there exists only one
maximising system, that is, a unique way for players to be arranged in time. The con-
figuration given by v+ provides an incentive to stay in the grand coalition, while v−
encourages all the players to stay alone all the time:
B
∗
N (v
+) = {(λ1, λ2, λ12), λ1 = λ2 = 0, and λ12 = 1}
B
∗
N (v
−) = {(λ1, λ2, λ12), λ1 = λ2 = 1, and λ12 = 0}.
The previous example shows that B∗N is not a lower hemicontinuous correspondence.
The following Theorem proves in one shot that B∗N is upper hemicontinuous and that
v → t¯(v) is continuous.
Theorem 3. The function v → t¯(v) is continuous and the correspondence v ⇒ B∗N(v) is
upper hemicontinuous on G(N).
Proof. Let f be the function defined on G(N)× [0, 1]2
N
→ R by f(v, λ) =
∑
S⊆N λSv(S),
and BN the constant correspondence which associates to each v ∈ G(N) the polytope
B(N). f is continuous, BN is a constant correspondence, therefore it is continuous,
furthermore since B(N) is a polytope, BN is compact-valued. We can apply immediately
the Berge’s maximum theorem (Berge, 1959) and conclude that
v → t¯(v) := max{f(λ, v)|λ ∈ Λ} − v(N)
is continuous, and
v ⇒ B∗N (v) := {λ ∈ B(N) |
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S) = v(N) + t¯(v).
is upper hemicontinuous.
3 Autonomous coalitions
3.1 Definition and first properties
The study of cooperative games shows that the core gives sometimes very controversial
solutions, the more classical example being the glove game defined on N = {1, 2, 3} by
v(i) = 0, ∀i ∈ N , v(12) = v(13) = v(123) = 1 and v(23) = 0. In this game the core
gives the unique payoff: x1 = 1, x2 = x3 = 0. We see that coalition {2, 3} earns the same
amount if it stays in the grand coalition (x({2, 3}) = 0) or out of the grand coalition
(v({2, 3}) = 0). This coalition has a kind of autonomy regarding to the payoff given by
the core, making the game unstable. Therefore, a game may be unstable if there exists
a subcoalition S of N such that no payoff vector in the core can ensure a strictly better
payoff than what S can achieve by itself, i.e., v(S).
More generally, a coalition is autonomous if it cannot earn more than its own worth
with a payoff vector given by the d-core. We give in this section a characterisation of
the existence of autonomous subcoalitions in the case of balanced games. We will show
8
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that if there exists an autonomous subcoalition, then there necessarily exists a collection
of autonomous coalitions covering N . Moreover, the restriction of a game to one of its
autonomous coalitions is always balanced, and the covering of autonomous coalitions is
always a balanced collection which generates the d-core. We say that a collection A of
coalitions is a covering of N if ∪A∈AA = N .
Definition 3. Let (N, v) be a game. A nonempty coalition T ⊆ N is autonomous for
(N, v) if for any payoff vector x of C(v t¯(v)), it holds x(T ) = v(T ). Similarly, a collection
A ⊆ 2N is an autonomous covering of N for v if it is a covering of N and ∀S ∈ A, S is
autonomous.
Note that N is an autonomous coalition if and only if v is balanced. Let us define
a maximising collection as a collection B such that there exists a maximising system
λ ∈ B(N) with B = B(λ). A first noteworthy result is the following.
Lemma 2. Let v ∈ G(N) be a game. Then any maximising collection is an autonomous
covering of N for v.
Proof. Let B be a maximising collection and take x ∈ C(v t¯(v)). There exists a maximising
system λ ∈ B(N) such that B = B(λ). By positivity of λS, S ∈ B:
v(N) + t¯(v) = x(N) =
∑
S∈B
λSx(S) ≥
∑
S∈B
λSv(S) = v(N) + t¯(v).
Hence equality holds throughout, forcing x(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ B. It follows that B is
an autonomous covering.
Definition 4 (Shellshear and Sudho¨lter (2009); Gillies (1953)). Let S be a coalition of
N . S is called vital (w.r.t (S, v)) if there exists x ∈ C(vS) such that x(T ) > v(T ) for all
T ∈ 2S \ {∅, S}.
Observe that vital coalitions are strongly linked with the notion of autonomous coali-
tion since it is possible to define alternatively a vital coalition as a coalition which is the
unique autonomous coalition of the game vS. If S is vital and if there exists a subcoalition
T which is autonomous, then for any members x of the core of vS, we have x(T ) = v(T )
that contradicts the Definition 4.
Proposition 2 ((Gillies, 1959)). S is vital if and only if for any balanced system λ ∈ B(S)
such that B(λ) 6= {S},
∑
T⊆S
λTv(T ) < v(S).
Since the restriction vS of a game v to a vital coalition is necessarily balanced, the
following Theorem contains Proposition 2.
Theorem 4. Let v ∈ G(N) be a balanced game. The following propositions are equiva-
lent:
(i) There exists a coalition S ⊂ N which is autonomous in (N, v).
(ii) There exists a collection A = {A1, . . . , Ak}, with Ai 6= N for i = 1, . . . , k, which is
an autonomous covering of N for v.
9
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.44
(iii) ∀ǫ > 0, C(v−ǫ) = ∅.
(iv) There exists λ∗ ∈ B(N) such that B(λ∗) 6= {N} is a minimal collection which is
maximising:
v(N) =
∑
S⊆N
λ∗Sv(S)
(v) N is not vital.
Proof. - (ii)⇒(i) is obvious.
- (i)⇒(ii): Let S 6= N be an autonomous coalition. Suppose per contra that there
exists i ∈ N such that for any T ⊂ N , T ∋ i, there exists x ∈ C(v) such that
x(T ) > v(T ). Since S is autonomous, we have i 6∈ S. For each T ⊂ N, T ∋ i,
choose xT ∈ C(v) such that xT (T ) > v(T ), and consider x
′ the center of gravity
of all these xT . By convexity x
′ ∈ C(v) and satisfies x′(T ) > v(T ) for all T ⊂ N ,
T ∋ i. Define
δ = min
T⊂N,T∋i
(x′(T )− v(T )) > 0,
and consider T ∗ for which the minimum is attained. Take j ∈ S and define the
payoff vector x∗ by x∗i = x
′
i − δ, x
∗
j = x
′
j + δ and x
∗
k = x
′
k for k ∈ N \ {i, j}. By
construction, x∗ belongs to the core of v, and satisfies x∗(S) > v(S), a contradiction
with the assumption on S.
- (ii)⇒(iii): Suppose there exists ǫ > 0 such that C(v−ǫ) 6= ∅. Take y ∈ C(v−ǫ) and
nonnegative numbers ǫ1, . . . , ǫn such that
∑n
i=1 ǫi = ǫ. Since (y1+ ǫ1, . . . , yn+ ǫn) ∈
C(v) and Aj is an autonomous coalition, we have for every Aj ∈ A
v(Aj) =
∑
i∈Aj
(yi + ǫi) ≥ y(Aj) ≥ v(Aj),
implying that equality holds throughout, and therefore ǫi = 0 for all i ∈ Aj. Since
this holds for every Aj ∈ A and A is a covering of N , it follows that ǫ1 = · · · =
ǫn = 0, which contradicts ǫ > 0.
- (iii)⇒(iv): Let us consider
F :=
{ ∑
S⊆N
λSv(S) | B(λ) minimal balanced collection ,B(λ) 6= {N}
}
.
Since F is a finite subset of R, there exists λ∗ ∈ B(N), and B(λ∗) 6= {N} minimal
balanced collection attaining the maximum of F , and we may define the game v¯
by: v¯(N) =
∑
S⊆N λ
∗
Sv(S), and v¯(S) = v(S) for any S ⊂ N . Observe that
v¯(N) =
∑
S⊆N
λ∗Sv(S) ≥
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S) =
∑
S⊆N
λS v¯(S)
for every λ ∈ B(N) such that B(λ) is minimal balanced collection different from
{N}, hence by Theorem 2, v¯ is balanced. However v is also balanced, hence by
Theorem 2 again, we have v¯(N) =
∑
S⊆N λ
∗
Sv(S) ≤ v(N). If v¯(N) < v(N), we
would have C(v−ǫ) 6= ∅ with ǫ = v(N)− v¯(N), a contradiction with (iii). Hence λ∗
satisfies v(N) =
∑
S⊆N λ
∗
Sv(S), and (iv) is proved.
10
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- (iv)⇒(ii): Take λ∗ ∈ B(N) such that B(λ∗) is a minimal balanced collection different
from {N} such that v(N) =
∑
S⊆N λ
∗
Sv(S). By Lemma 2, B(λ
∗) is an autonomous
covering of N , which does not contain N since B(λ∗) is minimal and different from
{N}.
- (i)⇔(v): it is a direct consequence of the Definition 4.
The following result, which is a corollary of Theorem 4, states that for balanced games,
it is impossible to have an exact information about the configuration of agents over time
and an exact information about the payoff vector. The uniqueness of a payoff given by
the core can only be achieved through the loss of the uniqueness of the configuration of
agents over time while by contraposition, the uniqueness of the configuration of players
in time, given by B∗N , implies that the core is not reduced to a point.
Corollary 1. Let v be a balanced game. If C(v) is a singleton, then B∗N (v) is a polytope
not reduced to a point.
Proof. If the polytope C(v) is a singleton, then its dimension is equal to 0, which implies
that at least |N | inequality constraints are equality contraints. Hence, v has at least
one autonomous coalition different from N , and according to Theorem 4(iv), there exists
λ∗ ∈ B∗N (v) such that B(λ
∗) 6= {N} is a minimal collection. However, {N} is also a
maximising collection, hence B∗N(v) is not reduced to a singleton.
The Theorem 4 can be applied to nonbalanced games as well, by applying it to v t¯(v).
Observe then that (iii) is always satisfied, which proves that a nonbalanced game has
always an autonomous coalition different from N . Hence we obtain:
Corollary 2. Let v ∈ G(N) be a nonbalanced game. Then there exists an autonomous
covering A = {A1, . . . , Ak} with Ai 6= N , i = 1, . . . , k of N for v, which is a minimal
balanced collection with a balanced system λ satisfying
v(N) + t¯(v) =
k∑
i=1
λAiv(Ai).
Note that this result can be directly deduced from Lemmas 1 and 2.
We have seen in the previous subsection that, for balanced games which satisfy one
of the assertion of Theorem 4, or for non-balanced games, there exist some autonomous
subcoalitions of N such that payoffs given by the d-core are always equal to the worth of
those coalitions. Hence, an autonomous coalition has no incentive to stay in the grand
coalition or to accept a payoff given by the d-core, and has an equal interest to play alone
from the point of view of coalitional rationality: Note that this point of view is enforced
by the fact that the restriction of a game to one of these autonomous coalitions has a
nonempty core.
Proposition 3. If S is autonomous, then C(vS) is nonempty.
Proof. If S is autonomous for a game v, then a solution x ∈ C(v t¯(v)) satisfies x(T ) ≥ v(T )
∀T ⊆ S and x(S) = v(S). Therefore (xi)i∈S ∈ C(vS).
11
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Observe that the Proposition 3 is not an equivalence, otherwise every singleton would
be an autonomous coalition.
However, since a player can be in several autonomous coalitions, it is difficult to
predict which of them will form. For example, the game v, defined on N = {1, 2, 3} by
v(S) = 100 if |S| = 2, and 0 otherwise, has three autonomous coalitions which are the
pairs of N . Each pair has a rational interest to leave the grand coalition, but, if one of
them leaves, the ”alone player” receives nothing. No player, in this case, knows if he will
be the ”alone player”. In this kind of game, each player is in a situation of uncertainty
regarding to which autonomous coalition will form. The next result shows that the d-core
ensures a payoff as good as one autonomous coalition would receive by leaving the grand
coalition, while avoiding the situation of uncertainty described above.
Proposition 4.
C(v t¯(v)) ⊆
⋂
S⊆N
S autonomous coalition of v
Ĉ(vS)
where
Ĉ(vS) := {x ∈ R
n | (xi)i∈S ∈ C(vS)}.
Proof. For any x ∈ C(v t¯(v)), we have x(S) = v(S) for any autonomous coalition S.
Moreover, every coalition of N satisfies the property: x(T ) ≥ v(T ), so in particular
x(T ) ≥ v(T ) for T ⊆ S.
Remark 1. The reverse inclusion is not true. For example, let v be the game over
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} defined by v(12) = v(34) = 2, v(13) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all other
T ⊆ N . Then (1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ d-C(v), S1 = {1, 2} and S2 = {3, 4} are the unique autonomous
coalitions. Let x = (0, 2, 0, 2), then, for i = 1, 2, xSi ∈ C(vSi). However, x 6∈ d-C(v).
Lastly, we note a concavity property for the set of autonomous coalitions: If S and T
are two autonomous coalitions for (N, v), then we have:
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
Indeed, let x ∈ C(v t¯(v)), we have :
v(S ∪ T ) ≤ x(S ∪ T ) = x(S) + x(T )− x(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ).
3.2 Links with maximising collections
Given v ∈ G(N), let us study the nature of the set AU(v) of its autonomous coalitions.
We prove in this section that AU(v) is balanced, as corollary, we will see the equiva-
lence between being a maximising collection and being a balanced system of autonomous
coalitions. First we need the following result:
Theorem 5. [Zumsteg (1995); Derks and Peters (1998)] A collection B ∈ 2N of nonempty
sets is balanced if and only if for every vector y ∈ Rn such that y(N) = 0, either y(S) = 0
for every S ∈ B or there exist S, T ∈ B such that y(S) > 0 and y(T ) < 0.
Theorem 6. For all game v, the collection AU(v) is balanced.
12
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Proof. Let x be the barycentre of d-C(v). Let y ∈ Rn. Suppose there exists y ∈ Rn such
that y(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ AU(v) and y(N) = 0. Since x is the barycentre of d-C(v), we have
x(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ AU(v) and x(S) > v(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ AU(v). Let ǫ be the
real number defined by:
ǫ := min
S∈2N\AU(v)
x(S)− v(S)
There exists k ∈ N such that
max
S∈2N
|y(S)|
k
< ǫ. We put y˜ = y
k
. We have: x(S) + y˜(S) ≥
v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N ; and x(N) + y˜(N) = x(N) + y
k
(N) = x(N). Hence x + y˜ ∈ d-C(v).
Therefore, ∀S ∈ AU(v), (x + y˜)(S) = v(S) and (x + y˜)(S) = v(S) + y˜(S). It follows
y(S) = 0 for any autonomous coalition S. By application of Theorem 5, we deduce that
AU(v) is balanced.
Corollary 3. The set of autonomous coalitions of a game v is a maximising collection
of v.
Hence, there is an equivalence between belonging to a maximising collection and being
an autonomous covering:
Theorem 7. Let v be a game in G(N). The following properties are equivalent:
(i) F is a maximising collection of v
(ii) F is a autonomous balanced covering of v
Proof. It is a corollary of Corollary 3 and Lemma 2.
4 Inescapability
We have seen that our purpose contained two different aspects: the payoff vector, on the
one hand, and the configuration of agents in coalition, on the other hand. A natural
question for both consists in defining when we have uniqueness. It is fairly simple to
know, by the dimension of the d-core, when a game gives a unique payoff vector:
Proposition 5. The dimension of the d-core of a game v is
dim(d-C(v)) = n− rank((|S ∩ T |)S,T∈AU(v)).
Proof. The d-core is a polytope, then its dimension is equal to n− d, where d is the size
of the largest collection of linearly independent equality constraints. Since the collection
of equality constraints corresponds to the collection {x(S) = v(S)}S∈AU(v), it comes that
the size of the largest linearly independent set of equality constraints is equal to the rank
of {χS}S∈AU(v). We know that the rank of a family of vector in an inner space is equal
to the rank of its corresponding Gram matrix. We can conclude by the observation that
〈χS, χT 〉 = |S ∩ T |.
We focus now on the conditions of uniqueness of the configuration of agents.
13
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4.1 Definition and first properties of inescapability
The glove game, defined for example in N = {1, 2, 3} by v(12) = v(13) = v(123) = 1
and 0 otherwise has four autonomous coalitions: 12, 13, 23, 123. We see that the set
of autonomous coalitions, which is by Theorem 7 a maximising collection, contains two
disjoint maximising collection: M1 = {12, 13, 23} and M2 = {123}, and since B
∗
123(v)
is a polytope not reduced to a point, there exists infinitely many arrangements of the
players in time. Hence, even if 12 is an autonomous coalition, that is a strong coalition,
it can be ”escapable” for the player 1 or 2 which can prefer to belong to the coalition 123.
Hence, among the set of autonomous coalitions, we want to differentiate the ones which
are escapable from the ones which are not.
Definition 5. Let v be a game in G(N). A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be inescapable
if every maximising collection contains S. Every autonomous coalition which is not
inescapable is called escapable.
Proposition 6. Let v be a game in G(N). If S is an autonomous coalition for (N, v),
then S is inescapable for every game (N, vǫ) defined, for any ǫ > 0, by vǫ(S) = v(S) + ǫ
and vǫ(T ) = v(T ), ∀T 6= S.
Proof. Let S be an autonomous coalition for the game v. By Theorem 7, there exists
λ ∈ B(N) a maximising system such that the maximising collection B(λ) contains S. Let
γ be a balanced system of N such that S 6∈ B(γ). Then
∑
T⊆N
γTvǫ(T ) =
∑
T⊆N
γTv(T )
≤
∑
T⊆N
λTv(T )
<
∑
T⊆N
λTvǫ(T ).
Therefore if γ is a balanced system such that S 6∈ B(γ), then γ is not a maximising
system for vǫ. Therefore S is inescapable for vǫ.
4.2 Games with a single state of cooperation.
Note that if every autonomous coalition of a game is inescapable, then the game has a
unique maximising collection.
Definition 6. A game v ∈ G(N) is said to be with a single state of cooperation (SSC
game) if it has a unique maximising collection.
We denote by SG(N) the set of SSC games.
Theorem 8. The set of SSC games SG(N) is dense in G(N).
Proof. We know that for any game v ∈ G(N), there always exists a maximising collection
B of v. Let O be a smallest subcollection of B which is maximising.Let ǫ > 0 and uǫ
be the game defined by uǫ(S) = v(S) +
|S|
|N |
ǫ if S ∈ O, and uǫ(S) = v(S) otherwise. Let
x ∈ d-C(v). We have x(S) = v(S) if S ∈ O. We put, for all i ∈ N , x˜i = xi +
ǫ
|N |
.
14
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We have x˜(S) = x(S) + |S|
|N |
ǫ which is equal to v(S) + |S|
|N |
ǫ = uǫ(S) if S ∈ O, and it is
strictly greater otherwise. Hence x˜ belongs to the d-core of uǫ and, by Theorem 7, O is a
maximising collection of uǫ. Suppose there exists a maximising collection of uǫ denoted
by A such that A 6= O.
Firstly, if there exists S ∈ A such that S 6∈ O then, since S is autonomous for uǫ,
∀y ∈ d-C(uǫ), y(S) = uǫ(S). It is a contradiction with x˜ ∈ d-C(uǫ) and x˜(S) > uǫ(S).
Secondly, assume A ⊆ O. If there exists S ∈ O such that S 6∈ A then, by construction
of O, we deduce that A is not balanced, a contradiction.
4.3 Links between vitality, autonomy and inescapability
In this section we study the relation between the concepts of autonomous coalitions, vi-
tal coalitions, and inescapable coalitions. First, by definition, an inescapable coalition
is always autonomous. Hence the set of inescapable coalitions is included in the set
of autonomous coalitions, with equality if and only if the game is SSC. Shellshear and
Sudho¨lter (2009) proves that there always exists a maximising collection of vital coali-
tions3, then by Theorem 7, the intersection between the set of vital coalitions and the set
of autonomous coalitions is always nonempty.
Proposition 7. Let v be a game. The set of inescapable coalitions of v is included in
the set of vital coalitions of v.
Proof. Let S be an inescapable coalition of (N, v) and α a maximising system. S is
autonomous and by Proposition 3, C(vS) 6= ∅. Then for any balanced system γ ∈ B(S),
v(S) ≥
∑
T⊆S
γTv(T ).
If S is not vital, then by Proposition 2, there exists a minimal balanced system λ ∈ B(S),
such that B(λ) 6= {S} and
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
λTv(T ).
Let α′ ∈ B(N) defined by
α′ = α + α(S)λ˜− δSα(S),
where λ˜ ∈ B(N) and δ ∈ {0, 1}2
N
are given by:
λ˜(T ) =
{
λ(T ), if T ⊆ S
0 otherwise,
and
δS(T ) =
{
1, if T = S
0 otherwise.
The relation ∑
T⊆N
α′(T )v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N
α(T )v(T )
3More precisely a maximising collection of strongly vital-exact coalitions.
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is satisfied, then α′ is a maximising system. Furthermore, λ ∈ B(S) is a minimal bal-
anced system satisfying B(λ) 6= {S}, hence λ(S) = 0, which implies α′(S) = 0. We
conclude that B(α′) is a maximising collection which does not contain S, implying that
S is escapable, a contradiction.
Remark 2. Let v be the glove game on N = {1, 2, 3} defined by v(12) = v(13) =
v(123) = 1 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. All singletons of this game are vital, but none
of them is autonomous. The coalitions 12,13 and 23 are autonomous and vital but not
inescapable.
Autonomous coalitions
vital coalitions
inescapable coalitions
Let us see now a condition on the game v for which these three notions of coalitions
become equivalent.
Definition 7. A game v is without imputations if for all coalition S ⊆ N , |S| > 1∑
i∈S
v(i) > v(S).
Proposition 8. A game v is without imputations if and only if the set of autonomous
coalitions, the set of inescapable coalitions and the set of vital coalitions of v are equal.
Proof. Claim 1: A game v is without imputations if and only if the singletons are the
unique maximising collection. If a game is without imputations, then for any coalition
S with at least two players, for any balanced collection B(λ) containing S, the balanced
system λ′ ∈ B(N) defined by λ′(T ) = λ(T ) if T 6= S and λ′(i) = λ(i) + λ(S) ∀i ∈ S
satisfies:
∑
T⊆N
λ(T )v(T ) ≤
∑
T⊆N
T 6=S
λ(T )v(T )+λ(S)v(S) <
∑
T⊆N
T 6=S
λ(T )v(T )+λ(S)
∑
i∈S
v(i) =
∑
T⊆N
λ′(T )v(T ).
Conversely, if the singletons are the unique maximising collection, then if there exists a
coalition S with at least two players such that
∑
i∈S
v(i) ≤ v(S) then:
∑
i∈N
v(i) < v(S) +
∑
i∈N\S
v(i),
a contradiction.
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Suppose v is a game without imputations, by Claim 1, v is SSC, and the singletons
are the autonomous coalitions (and also the inescapable coalitions). Furthermore, by
Proposition 2 the singletons are the unique vital coalitions. Hence the three types of
coalition coincide.
Conversely, if v is a game such that the set of autonomous coalitions, the set of in-
escapable coalitions and the set of vital coalitions of v are equal, then, since the singletons
are always vital, the set of singletons is included into the set of autonomous coalitions.
Since the set of singletons is a balanced collection and it is an autonomous covering equal
to the set of inescapable coalitions, we deduce that it is the unique maximising collection.
Hence, by Claim 1, v is without imputations.
5 Final remarks
The results of our investigation show that there exist deep links between autonomous
coalitions and the concepts of core, c-core, d-core and also the negotiation set:
(i) A game v is balanced if and only if N is autonomous, and the set of SSC bal-
anced games is dense over the set of balanced games. In this case, not SSC games
corresponds to games which satisfies one of the assertions of Theorem 4;
(ii) A game v is c-balanced if and only if there exists an autonomous covering which is
a partition.
We can also define two other concepts of core with the use of k-preimputations, the
first one being the k-additive core (Grabisch and Miranda, 2008) defined by:
C
k(v) := {(xS)S⊆N
S 6=∅
∈ k-PI(v), ∀T ⊆ N
∑
S⊆T
xS ≥ v(T )},
and the second one being the negotiation set (Gonzalez and Grabisch, forthcoming) de-
fined by:
I
n
1(v) := argmin
x∈Ck(v)
∑
S⊆N
|S|≥2
|xS|.
The negotiation set of a game v can be interpreted as the set of k-preimputations which
are as close as possible to the set of preimputations, and such that the sum of amounts
given to the subsets of a coalition is larger than its worth.
It could be interesting to know what is the ”largest” autonomous coalition, that is,
how many players an autonomous coalition can contain? The negotiation set gives an
answer to this question. The greatest (in the sense of inclusion) autonomous coalitions
correspond to coalitions T such that xT = 0 for all x ∈ I
n
1(v), and any superset of T does
not satisfy this property. The economic interpretation is the following: The negociation
set maximises what we can give to individuals for ensuring coalitional rationality, and
shares the debts only to the coalitions of size larger than 2: if x ∈ In1(v), then ∀S ⊆ N
such that |S| ≥ 2, we have xS ≤ 0. The following theorem ensures that the autonomous
coalitions do not pay the debts, that is, a coalition has to pay some debt if and only if it
is not contained in some autonomous coalition.
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Theorem 9 (Gonzalez and Grabisch (forthcoming)). Let v be a game on N , and S be
a coalition of N such that |S| ≥ 2. The following properties are equivalent:
(i) There exists T ⊇ S such that T is autonomous.
(ii) ∀x ∈ In1 (v), xS = 0.
References
W. Albers. Zwei Lo¨sungskonzepte fu¨r kooperative Mehrpersonenspiele, die auf Anspruch-
snivaus der Spieler basieren. OR-Verfahren/ Methods of Operations Research XVIII,
XVIII:1–8, 1974.
W. Albers. Core- and kernel-variants based on imputations and demand profiles. In
O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, editors, Game Theory and Related Topics. North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.
C. Bejan and J. C. Go´mez. Using the aspiration core to predict coalition formation.
International Game Theory Review, 2012a.
C. Bejan and J. C. Go´mez. Axiomatizing core extensions. International Journal of Game
Theory, 2012b.
E. Bennett. The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff dis-
tribution in sidepayment games. International Journal of Game Theory, 12(1):1–28,
1983.
C. Berge. Espaces topologiques. Dunod Paris, 1959.
O. Bondareva. Some applications of linear programming methods to the therory of co-
operative games. Problemy Kibernetiki, 10:119–139, 1963.
J. C. Cesco. Nonempty core-type solutions over balanced coalitions in tu-games. Inter-
national Game Theory Review, 14(03), 2012.
J. Cross. Some economic characteristics of economic and political coalitions. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 11:184–195, 1967.
J. Derks and H. Peters. Orderings, excess functions, and the nucleolus. Mathematical
social sciences, 36(2):175–182, 1998.
D. Gillies. Some theorems on n-person games. PhD thesis, Princeton, New Jersey, 1953.
D. Gillies. Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. Contributions to the Theory of
Games, 4:47–85, 1959.
S. Gonzalez and M. Grabisch. Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games.
International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
M. Grabisch and P. Miranda. On the vertices of the k-additive core. Discrete Mathematics,
308:5204–5217, 2008.
18
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.44
R. Guesnerie and C. Oddou. On economic games which are not necessarily superaddi-
tive:solution concept and application to a local public good problem with few a agents.
Economics Letters, 3:301–306, 1979.
Y. Kannai. The core and balancedness. In R. J Aumann and S. Hart, editors, Handbook
of Game Theory with Economic Applications. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1992.
B. Peleg and P. Sudho¨lter. Introduction to the theory of cooperative games. Kluwer
Academic Publisher, 2003.
L. S. Shapley. On balanced sets and cores. Naval Research Logistics Quaterly, 14:453–460,
1967.
E. Shellshear and P. Sudho¨lter. On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability.
Games and Economic Behavior, 67:633–644, 2009.
N. Sun, W. Trockel, and Z. Yang. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition for-
mation in an n-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 44:853–860, 2008.
G. Turbay. On value theories for n-person cooperative games. PhD thesis, Rice univ,
Houston Tx, 1977.
S.M. Zumsteg. Non-Cooperative Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory and Related Com-
putational Problems. PhD thesis, Eidgenossischen Technischen Hochschule Zurich,
1995.
19
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.44
